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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
sound, as the plaintiff apparently failed to establish the authority
21
of the agent to waive the breach of the condition.
The statutory form22 of the standard fire policy avoids many
of the difficulties of the above clause as it omits the word "void"
and inserts the following clause:
"This company shall not be liable for loss or damage
occurring . . . . while there is kept, used or allowed on the
described premises . . . . gasoline . ."
The effect of the statutory form is to make the clause an exception
rather than a condition, as in the instant case. Should the agent,
after loss, attempt to waive this clause, an insured would have to
prove not only the agent's authority, but also a valid supporting
consideration, because such a waiver in effect would create an
23
entirely new contract.

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS INDENTURE

-

FORECLOSURE OF CORPORATE TRUST

POWER OF EQUITY COURT TO DISREGARD CONTRACT

RIGHTS OF MAJORITY BONDHOLDERS. - Following default in payment of interest and principal by defendant theatre corporation,
plaintiffs as trustees for a large bond issue sought foreclosure by
a court of equity in accordance with the provisions of the trust
indenture.' The amended bill prayed for a receivership and for
21 Plaintiff's witness (defendant's secretary) testified without contradiction
that the agent had no authority to bind the defendant in this manner. See
supra n. 19.
22 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 33, art. 4, § 7.
23 McCoy v. N. W. Mut. Relief Ass'n, 92 Wis. 577, 66 N. W. 697, 47 L. R.
A. 681 (1896).
1 In the ordinary case of default in bonded indebtedness, the trustee for
the bondholders usually institutes suit to foreclose the mortgage security.
Thereafter, certain individuals offer themselves as a Protective Committee for
the bondholders, this bbing arranged often by the debtor's bankers or by the
issuing house. The Protective Committee then invites deposit of the bonds,
by the bondholders, those depositing passing thereby to the committee legal
title and complete authority to act in foreclosure proceedings. There is retained by the depositors simply equitable title, evidenced by the certificate
of deposit issued by the committee. Frequently, nearly all bondholders in
this fashion turn over their holdings: in any event, a decided majority can
normally be obtained without much effort. Eventually, at the subsequent
foreclosure sale, a representative of the Protective Committee bids in the
property at the upset figure fixed by the equity court. While the old bonds can
be applied partially on the purchase price, new money has to be raised by the
committee to take care of expenses of the suit, (including fees for the trustee
and counsel, and court costs), and to pay off in cash the non-assenting minority bondholders. Of course by assessment proportionately against the de-
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discretionary sale by the trustee of the mortgage res; later, the
trustees also sought to oust the defendant's lessee on the ground
that advantageous sale or lease of the theatre property might be
jeopardized by the tenant's connection with a large motion-picture
producing concern. Meantime, a Protective Committee had been
organized and was functioning, having procured deposits of roughly two-thirds of the outstanding bonds. In spite of the express
provision of the trust deed that no one or more bondholders should
have "any right in any manner whatever to affect, disturb or
prejudice" the lien of the mortgage by any action, or "to enforce
any right" thereunder, except in the manner therein provided, a
group of minority bondholders sought to intervene independently
in the foreclosure proceedings. By the express language of the
corporate indenture, every effort had been undertaken to prevent
such interference by the minority with the broad discretionary
powers vested in the trustees. The dissentient group, which held
bonds totalling in face vaiue about one-sixth of the debt, interposed
a claim that one of the plaintiffs was disqualified from acting as
trustee, in that this plaintiff was serving as depositary for the Protective Committee :2 accordingly, it was insisted that minority intervention was vitally necessary in order to afford the trial chancellor an impartial survey of "a dispute between two groups of
bondholders". The petition for intervention was granted, and the
intervenors made parties defendant; they then moved forthwith
for immediate sale.3 The equity court, both on the intervenors'
motion and sua sponte, decreed sale and refused to terminate the
existing tenancy. However, it did not act on the petition of the
trustees formally raising the question of their right to demand
positing bondholders, the latter may acquire full ownership of the property
for their own account. However, it is more likely that the Protective Committee will decide to secure the necessary funds from the junior obligation
holders and from stockholders. Technically, these groups have been wiped
out by the foreclosure, but the Protective Committee usually agrees to let them
get back in "on the ground floor". A striking feature of corporate reorganizations is the alacrity with which the offer is accepted: the investor always
returs
to his investment, feeling perhaps that he ought to have just one more
"gol ' at that particular enterprise. So the net result becomes a new corporation conducting the business, but with the old familiar faces predominating behind the capital investment.
The above procedure regularly employed in the past has now been supplemented by the corporation reorganization method set forth in Section 77B,
of the amended federal bankruptcy law. But see In re Tennessee Pub. Co.,
81 F. (2d) 463 (1936).
2 The upper court held that the deposit agreement did not create any
financial interest which might run counter to the plaintiff's duties as an impartial trustee.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol42/iss3/13

2

et al.: Private Corporations--Foreclosure of Corporate Trust Indenture--P
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
credit or bonded indebtedness as against their bid, if they were to
buy in at foreclosure sale. Plaintiffs appealed from the decrees as
to immediate sale and as to continuation of the tenant's leasehold. The underlying issue was the extent of the chancellor's
jurisdiction to decree relief, irrespective of the provisions of the
trust indenture.' Held, that the contract rights of the parties
should be effectuated, "in the absence of fraud or some other defined ground warranting equity interference." Decrees reversed.
Cleveland Trust Co. v. Capitol Theater Co.5
An important jurisdictional question met with at the start has
to do with the authority of the trial court even to entertain such
a foreclosure suit, in the light of the existing statutory procedure
for sale by trustees under a trust deed.0 It seems clear that the
statute simply provides means for relieving courts from congestion
where an adequate remedy can be made available without resort
to the equity side; obviously, the complicated corporate bond issue
should not be disposed of by so drastic a method. The present
decision has inferentially established the jurisdiction of a West
Virginia chancellor to handle corporate reorganizations, where the
powers of the trustee under an intricate and involved instrument,
cannot properly be exercised." The doctrine of this sound holding
seems sufficiently comprehensive to cover any state court receiver3 The Protective Committee desired that foreclosure sale be deferred lntil
contact had been made with all bondholders, - and until a satisfactory reorganization plan had been approved not only by the bondholders but, as well,
by the Securities and Exchange Commission, in Washington. The plaintiff
trustees, believing such procedure desirable and beneficial to everyone alike,
urged on the court the advantage of temporary delay.
4 It is to be noted that the corporate reorganization had barely been begun
in the principal case. While the foreclosure suit was in progress, and the
Protective Committee had been set up and was functioning, nevertheless the
whole issue of sale procedure was in dispute. The question of postponement
had to be disposed of before the majority group could formulate their plan
for buying in the property. Next,the extent of their privilege of paying the
purchase price with bonds would eventually have to be ascertained. Finally,
the details of recapitalization should presumably require approval by the
appropriate authority.
5183 S. E. 457 (W. Va. 1936).
6 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 38, art. 1, § 2. By letter addressed to counsel
in the case at bar by the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Appeals, the views
of counsel were specifically requested by that Court on the broad issue:
"If the instrument securing the bonds is a Deed of Trust with full
powers in the Trustees, why Equity?"
7 Hanna & Lightner v. Galford, 55 W. Va. 160, 47 S. E. 359 (1905); Elder
v. Gibson, 109 W. Va. 582, 155 S.E. 662 (1930).
8 George, Trustee v. Zinn, 57 W. Va. 15, 49 S.E. 904 (1905); Mankin v.
Dickinson, 76 W. Va- 128, 85 S. E. 74 (1915); Downes v. Long LumbQr Co.,
99 W. Va. 267, 128 S.E. 385 (1925) ; Finnell v. Jordan, 102 W. Va. 339, 135
S. E. 179 (1926).
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ship proceeding following a mortgage default, where the parties
desire to avoid the 77B federal bankruptcy reorganization.
The problem presented by the minority bondholders' petition
seeking intervention is much more difficult. 9 The essential principle is well-settled in the ordinary situation where litigants attempt to intervene: they must show an interest not represented
fairly by a party already before the court. In order that complete justice be done, equity will normally admit such intervenors;
otherwise, it might appear inequitable to deny an interested party
a hearing on some theory of virtual representation.1 0 The trial
chancellor here ignored the provisions of the indenture seeking to
burke minority intervention, thus indicating that the right to their
day in court could hardly be contracted away. The language of
the upper court is not altogether precise on this point."- Arguably,
the lower court erred in not excluding the minority altogether, in
accordance with the express stipulations of the mortgage; in other
words, the right to intervene had been voluntarily relinquished.
Nevertheless, equity courts are as a rule so reluctant to refuse intervention that the instant case should scarcely be deemed a binding precedent. Clearer dicta should be necessary before the profession can safely assume that the chancellor will enforce to the
12
letter an agreement not to intervene.
Once the court had assumed jurisdiction of the subject-matter
of the suit, the decree for the sale of the property should prima
facie have complied, under the authorities, with the terms of the
indenture." The vital issue in the case, - and the one which
9See Moore and Levi, Federal Intervention, I. The Bight to Intervene and
Beorganization (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 565, at 603.
10 Fowler v. Lewis's Adm'r, 36 W. Va. 112, 14 S.E. 447 (1892) ; Freeman
v. Egnor, 72 W. Va. 830, 79 S. E. 824 (1912); Cassady v. Cassady, 74 W.
Va. 53, 18 S. E. 829 (1914) ; Robertson Grocery Co. v. Kinser, 93 W. Va. 172,
116 S. E. 141 (1923); Lynch v. Armstrong, 99 W. Va. 609, 130 S. E. 268
(1925); Stevenson v. Machine Co., 103 W. Va. 120, 136 S. E. 695 (1927);
Conley v. International Pump Co., 237 Fed. 286 (1915); Guaranty Trust
Co. of N. Y. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 15 F. (2d) 434 (1926);
CLEPHANE, EQuITY PLrEADinG (1926) § 31. Cf. Fed. Eq. Rules § 37.
"" .... The above quoted provisions of the instrument indicate the pains

exerted in the preparation of the trust to prevent interference with the trustees
by minority bondholders..... In the absence of fraud or other misconduct
on their part, the trustees are entitled to proceed in reasonable compliance
with the terms of the trust...... " (Italics supplied). (183 S.B. 457, 460).
The writer believes (a) the upper court dfd not hold squarely against
minority intervention, and (b) the trial chancellor did not abuse his discretion
in permitting such intervention despite the trust provisions.
13 Crumlish v. Railroad Co., 32 W. Va. 244, 9 S. E. 180 (1889); Atkinson
v. Beekett, 34 W. Va. 584, 12 S. E. 717 (1890); George, Trustee v. Zinn,
supra n. 8, at 25, 26; Copelan v. Sohn, 75 W. Va. 83, 82 S.E. 1016 (1914);
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concerns most of those who have to do with corporate reorganization practice, - is the extent to which the trial court may disregard the express arrangement between the parties, in order to
achieve complete fairness in the result. Conversely stated, the
point in dispute is whether the chancellor's discretion may be controlled wholly by a contract of adhesion, - a contract in which
the terms are usually phrased in accordance with a form prescribed
by the issuers, to which terms the minority bondholder may "adhere" if he chooses to invest in the particular issue, but which
terms he cannot change by any process of bargaining at arm's
length. 14 No doubt historically the flexible jurisdiction of equity,
viewing each case on its facts and bound by precedent only where
principle was concerned, once actively bestirred itself to remold
contracts in order to avert hardship. Indeed, the underlying test
was originally one of fairness, - no hard bargain could survive
the chancellor's decree. 15 During the last century, the concept of
freedom of contract became paramount in the common law.' 0 In
this modern period of the decadence of equity, 1 it has been the
practice to look first to the contract of the parties, and secondarily
to the defned ground for equity intervention. Normally, in the
absence of fraud or mistake, the agreement made is thus enforced,
no matter how unfair its terms may prove to be. To-day, considerations of hardship often play little part in cases where "equity
follows the law"; it is frequently unnecessary that one who seeks
equity should do equity. ' Accordingly, in the present litigation,
Wytheville Ice Co. v. Frick, 96 Va. 141, 30 S. E. 491 (1898); New York L.
Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 146 Va. 197, 135 S. E. 882 (1926).
14 Cf. the opinion of the upper court as to this: I. . . . All purchasers of
the bonds bought in the light of those emphatic stipulations. By becoming
purchasers, they voluntarily subscribed to the terms of the instrument. .... "
(183 S. B. 457, 460). Yet express provisions in other contracts of adhesion,
(such as insurance policies), do not necessarily control the court. "Thus,
to hold an insured strictly to terms in the choosing of which he had no part,
and the meaning of which he often cannot understand, would often work
gross injustice which the courts are loth to inflict."
VANCE, INSURANCE (2d
ed. 1930) 201. Perhaps the difference lies in the, fact that America has not
yet become a nation of investors, as it is already one of insurance policyholders.
15 Cf. "Laws covet to be ruled by equity."
ST. GERMAIN, DOCTORa Am
STUDENT (1518) (18th ed. 1815) Dial. I, c. XVI, 45.
10 "To permit parties to enter into contracts, obtain their benefit, and then
to repudiate any obligations undertaken is prima facie, at all events, contrary
to the interests and well-being of any society."
Per Jessell, M. R., in Printing, etc., Co. v. Sampson, L. R. 19 Eq. 462, 465 (1875).
17 See Pound, The Decadence of Equity (1905) 5 COL. L. REV. 20.
Is The outstanding authority to this effect is naturally Graf v. Hope Bldg.
Corp., 254 N. Y. 1, 171 N. E. 884 (1930), cited by the court in the principal
case (183 S. E. 457, 459). The Graf case is noted inter alia in (1930) 30
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the decision merely proceeded in accordance with current judicial
thought in holding that "courts of equity are not vested with unlimited authority to disturb rights of contract." The trial chancellor was reversed, in so far as the traditional power of equity
had permitted the decree for immediate sale."9
There is no absolute standard by which one can criticize such
a holding that the provisions of the deed of trust must govern
in foreclosure proceedings, on the issue as to whether the discretion is to be in the trustees or in the chancellor. Certainly, the
question is one of policy. In exceptional cases, equity has indeed
modified contractual rights. For example, equity will allow delay
of sale under a deed of trust where prior judgment. liens are concerned and it is necessary to resort to equity to enforce these liens.
There the sale is said to be according to the rules of equity, without regard to the provisions of the trust instrument. 20 A similar
result has been reached where the amount of the debt secured by
the trust deed is uncertain, and yet to be determined, 21 - or when
it is shown that the sale would be against good conscience, or that
particular circumstances, extrinsic to the instrument, would render enforcement inequitable and work irreparable injury.22 Had
it been conclusively shown here that to follow the terms of the
trust deed as to sale would have led to an inequitable result inuring to the bondholders, the court should have been allowed to interfere with the terms of the trust deed, and to decree sale. After
all, it is more than likely the reviewing court felt on these facts
that the minority intervenors had failed to make out theik case.
CoL. L. REv. 1064; (1931) 16 CORN. L. Q. 106;
(1931) 79 U. PA. L. REV. 229; (1931) 17 VA.
YALE L. J. 141.
19 Cf. on the general problem of the power of
44 HAZv. L. Ray. 92.
20 Barbour v. Tompkins, 31 W. Va. 410, 7 S.

(1931) 29 Mien. L. Rv.380;
L. REV. 80, and in (1931) 40
a court of equity, Note (1930)
E. 1 (1888) ; Hart v. Larkin,

66 W. Va. 227, 66 S. E. 331 (1909).
21 Marshall v. Porter, 71 W. Va. 330, 331, 76 S. E. 653, 654 (1912); McGraw v. Morgan, 85 W. Va. 257, 101 S. E. 463 (1919); Fine v. Zirkle, 88 W.
Va. 265, 106 S. E. 631 (1921).
22 Tooke v. Newman, 75 fl. 215 (1874); Gato v. Christian, 112 Me. 427,
92 Atl. 489 (1914); American House Hotel Co. v. Hemenway, 237 Mass. 180,
129 N. E. 371 (1921) ; McCombs v. Elmes, 197 Mass. 19, 83 N. B. 306 (1907) ;

Case v. O'Brien, 66 Mich. 289, 33 N. W. 405 (1887); Leak v. Armfield, 187
N. C. 625, 122 S. E. 393 (1924). See Mayor, etc. of City of Baltimore v.
United Ry.& Electric Co., 108 Md. 64, 69 Atl. 436 (1908); City of Detroit v.

Detroit United Ry., 226 Mich. 354, 197 N. W. 697 (1924); Norfolk Southern
Ry. Co. v. Guaranty Trust Co., 13 F. (2d) 979 (1926); N. J. Nat. Bank
& Trust Co. v. Lincoln Mortgage & T. G. Co., 105 N. J. Eq. 557, 148 Atl. 713

(1930); New York State Rys. v. Security Trust Co., 135 Misc. Rep. 456, 238
N. Y. S.354 (1929).
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In other words, there had been no showing of extreme hardship to
the minority if the sale were reasonably deferred: the "equities"
of the litigation appeared to be with the trustees. Viewed thus,
the syllabus may seem broader than the record in this litigation
actually requires. Certainly it is unlikely that the informed discretion of the chancellor in corporation reorganization work may
be wholly excluded by a myriad of paragraphs in the indenture.
The present decision accordingly is one of considerable import
for corporate bondholders. It has settled the issue of foreclosure
jurisdiction, and has indicated that a very strong showing must
be made before the terms of the bond issue may be disregarded
wholly. Thus the court has upheld an authority in the majority
bondholders, controlling the discretion of the trustees, where so
stipulated. Perhaps, a more definite ruling may soon be had on
the privilege of the minority to intervene in every case, agreements
to the contrary notwithstanding.

QUASI-CONTRACTS -

RECOVERY FOR MISTAKE OF LAW

-

SET-

TLEMENT OF DispuTm CLAIM. - At a prior time, action had been
begun against the present plaintiff, as receiver of an insolvent
bank, to compel him to pay over the entire depositor's claim of
a county. Believing that the county had priority over general
creditors by virtue of an earlier decision' and at the direction of
the commissioner of banking, plaintiff paid the claim in full. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Appeals held that a county was
not entitled on these facts to preference over general creditors. 2
Plaintiff then sued to recover the overpayment on the ground
of mistake of law. Held, that there can be no recovery. Finnell v.
Peoples Bank of Keyser.3
The doctrine that money paid under a mistake of law cannot
be recovered is almost universally recognized.4 Before the nine' Woodyard v. Sayre, 90 W. Va. 295, 110 S. E. 689, 24 A. L. R. 1497 (1922).
2 Calhoun County Court v. Mathews, 99 W. Va. 483, 129 S. E. 399, 52 A.

L. R. 751 (1925).
a 182 S. E. 888 (W. Va. 1935).
4 Bilbie v. Lumley, 2 East 469 (1802) ; Gaffney v. Stowers, 73 W. Va. 420,
80 S. E. 401 (1913); Shriver v. Garrison, 30 W. Va. 456, 4 S. E. 660 (1887);
Beard v. Beard, 25 W. Va. 486, 52 Am. Rep. 219 (1885): Haigh v. United
States Bldg. etc. Ass'n, 19 W. Va. 792 (1882); Mayor of Richmond v. Xudah,
5 Leigh 305 (Va. 1834); Cf. Burgess v. City of Cameron, 113 W. Va. 127,
166 S. E. 113 (1932); and for a compilation of cases with annotations, see
(1911) 19 Ann. Cas. 794; (1926) 42 A. L. R. 305; (1927) 48 A. L. R. 1381;
(1928) 53 A. L. R. 949; (1929) 63 A. L. R. 1346; (1931) 75 A. L. R. 658;
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